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The Influence of Desire for Control on Monitoring Decisions and Performance 
Outcomes in Strategic Alliances 
 
Abstract 
Strategic alliances are fraught with risks, such as the uncontrolled disclosure of core knowledge 
via opportunistic learning. The usefulness of monitoring in policing opportunism 
notwithstanding, a contrasting view is that monitoring mechanisms can themselves manifest 
the dark side of strategic alliances. The present study argues that a novel dark personality trait—
the focal firm’s desire for control—may influence key decisions pertaining to how to monitor 
strategic alliances, which in turn can negatively impact performance outcomes. Our conceptual 
model was developed and tested, based on a survey of 404 strategic alliances. The results 
demonstrate that a focal firm’s desire for control is positively associated with process 
monitoring as well as output monitoring. The firm’s use of process monitoring to oversee the 
counterpart drives its performance outcomes only if there is a low level of information 
exchange between the alliance partners; as such, information exchange norms substitute for 
process monitoring. By contrast, the focal firm’s use of outcome monitoring is negatively 
linked to performance unless complemented by a high level of information exchange. Key 
implications for alliance management and future research are derived from the findings. 
 
Keywords: Dark Side; Desire for Control; Monitoring; Performance; Substitutes and 
Complements; Governance Mechanisms; Strategic Alliances  
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1. Introduction 
A growing number of firms are establishing strategic alliances with partners to combine 
complementary knowledge as a means of value co-creation and sustainable growth (Kale & 
Singh, 2009). Strategic alliances concern a “formal agreement between two or more business 
organizations to pursue a set of private and common interests through the sharing of resources 
in contexts involving uncertainty over outcomes” (Ariňo, De la Torre, & Ring, 2001, p. 110). 
Despite their benefits, approximately 50 percent of strategic alliances underperform (Kale & 
Singh, 2009). A common explanation for failing alliances is the disclosure of core knowledge 
and loss of competitive advantages to a partner firm stemming from their opportunism (Jap & 
Anderson, 2003). The scope for opportunism is a natural limitation of the juxtaposition of 
competition and cooperation in strategic alliances.  
The dominant strand of alliance performance research in marketing and management suggests 
success can be achieved on the basis of trust and commitment within a social exchange (i.e., 
embedded) type of relationship (Gomes, Barnes, & Mahmood, 2014; Robson, Skarmeas, & 
Spyropoulou, 2006). Within a trusting type of alliance the risk of opportunistic behavior 
normally reduces, and inefficiencies linked to mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing 
contracts may be avoided (Jiang, Jiang, Cai, & Liu, 2015). Notwithstanding the insights of 
previous research on social exchange relations, such work neglects the dark side of close 
relationships; which refers to the downside of the same soft ties (e.g., trust and commitment) 
used to strengthen alliance relationships (Anderson & Jap, 2005).  
Emerging work on the dark side of alliances has taken important steps toward understanding 
negative effects of soft ties in close relationships, such as increased vulnerability to 
opportunism and knowledge redundancy (Noordhoff, Kyriakopoulos, Moorman, Pauwells, & 
Dellaert, 2011). Still, although alliances by definition imply cooperation between partners, not 
all alliances develop soft ties due to the rise of competitive tensions. The literature has yet to 
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emphasize whether these alliances are subject to dark side effects that preclude embedded 
relationships, by asserting instead the need for control over the partner’s work (Cho, 2006). 
Our study sheds light on the matter by addressing the question: does the dark personality trait, 
desire for control, manifest itself through control mechanisms in a manner detrimental to 
alliance performance? Specifically, we investigate whether desire for control in firms drives 
self-serving monitoring decisions that attenuate the performance outcomes of strategic 
alliances. We define desire for control as the ambition of a focal firm to exercise control and 
dominance over the alliance’s strategic decisions and operating procedures (Dahling, Whitaker, 
& Levy, 2009). This trait does not emerge from embedded relationships, but rather resides 
within the firm and shapes its view of and approach to alliances. The pragmatic relevance of 
desire for control emerged in a prestudy interview:  
“At a recent away day our senior management arranged for some psychologists to profile our 
managers. They used a test based on three canine profiles: Labradors, Greyhounds, and 
Alsatians. We ended up with 35 Alsatians and one Greyhound. The implication is that we like 
to bark orders in our alliances. If a partner rolls over, we will never respect them. They cannot 
be relied upon to look after their own goals, let alone ours...” 
The study makes three main contributions to knowledge. First, we introduce the dark 
personality trait, desire for control, to a literature stream that has featured the onset of the dark 
side of close relationships, but has yet to theorize the dark side of personality traits that 
discourages a partner firm from even embarking down the path to embeddedness. With few 
notable exceptions (e.g., Bierly & Gallagher, 2007), studies have yet to examine how alliance 
decisions emerge from traits of partner firms. Based on upper echelons theory (e.g., Hambrick, 
2007), we argue that the individual traits of a firm’s senior alliance managers combine to shape 
a firm-level trait (i.e., desire for control) with decision relevance. 
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Second, as strategic alliances make partners vulnerable to opportunism, and opportunistic 
actions arrest partners’ co-creation of value (Barnes, Leonidou, Siu, & Leonidou, 2010), 
theorists claim alliance activities must be monitored to ensure that partners perform tasks in a 
manner conducive to the achievement of common goals (Luo, 2007). Still, the literature is 
unclear regarding what drives monitoring decisions in alliances (Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). 
Drawing upon personality trait theory (e.g., Funder, 2001), we posit that desire for control 
determines how the alliance monitoring task is organized. Specifically, we show for the first 
time that a firm’s desire for control encourages the use of process and output monitoring 
mechanisms. The logic is that desire for control drives the firm to enact self-serving monitoring 
routines that are not necessarily oriented toward shared goals in the alliance (Greenbaum, Hill, 
Mawritz, & Quade, 2014; O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012). 
Third, despite concerted research attention among scholars, agreement on the relationship 
between monitoring and alliance performance is lacking in the literature (Heide, Wathne, & 
Rokkan, 2007). One set of scholars claims control mechanisms deter performance outcomes 
(Jiang, Li, & Gao, 2008; Zhang & Zhou, 2013), while others assert that they have a positive 
impact on performance (Chen, Chen, & Zhou, 2014; Grewal, Chakravarty, & Saini, 2010). We 
argue that this inconsistency is linked to the roles of different, unilateral (process monitoring 
and output monitoring) and bilateral (information exchange norms) approaches to the 
monitoring task. Adding to recent debate on interactions between governance approaches 
(Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Gundlach & Cannon, 2010; Stouthuysen, Slabbinck, & Roodhooft, 
2012), we find that monitoring mechanisms substitute or complement each other in enhancing 
performance. Specifically, information exchange norms substitute for process monitoring, but 
complement output monitoring. 
2. Literature review and theoretical background 
2.1. Dark side of alliance relationships 
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For the past two decades, substantial research has focused on the bright side of industrial 
relationships, suggesting that partner firms may achieve greater benefits from building soft ties 
than doing otherwise (e.g., Beck, Chapman, & Palmatier, 2015; Fang, Chang, & Peng, 2011; 
Noordhoff et al., 2011). Yet the continued underperformance of numerous alliances suggests 
practitioners require insights into how to successfully manage these partnerships through times 
of behavioral turbulence (Bello, Katsikeas, & Robson, 2010). In response, growing work has 
established that close business relationships sometimes become over-embedded, wherein 
rigidity and complacency effects weaken performance (Grayson & Ambler, 1999; Hibbard, 
Brunel, Dant, & Iacobucci, 2001; Scheer, Hibbs, & Trulaske, 2012). This supposed dark side 
of close relationships, “undermines relationships in which the parties are confident and 
optimistic about their collaboration” (Anderson & Jap, 2005, p. 76) (see Appendix for a 
summary of studies on the dark side of interfirm alliances and partnerships). 
Our review of the literature suggests studies have mainly used relational and economics 
perspectives to explain that the dark side of business relationships emerges from the same 
mechanisms that are used to build close relationships (e.g., trust). Notwithstanding the 
pragmatic insights such work has produced, the focus on side-effects of close relationships 
neglects the broader picture of the dark side of relationships generally (Jap & Anderson, 2003); 
the dark side is not a unanimous phenomenon. To this point, we propose that scholars should 
apply different mechanisms in order to generate perspectives on other driving forces of the dark 
side of strategic alliances; how these manifest operationally (e.g., in governance terms); and 
their consequences for performance outcomes. 
Indeed, there is a need to examine the dark side phenomenon from a dark psychological 
perspective rather than applying the assumption that a relationship develops over time, only to 
be exploited for economic gain. A large number of alliance relationships dissolve (Kale & 
Singh, 2009) without ever becoming close. Instead of studying negative outcomes of raised 
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vulnerability from soft ties (e.g., unforeseen partner opportunism and reduced performance), 
we theorize the downside of dark personality traits (e.g., use of self-serving control and 
negative outcomes thereof). Specifically, our study aims to enhance understanding of the dark 
side of business alliances by looking at the extent to which the desire to control (pooled and 
newly created) core knowledge in the alliance drives self-serving monitoring mechanisms that, 
under certain circumstances, diminish performance. 
2.2. Governance approaches and monitoring 
Research has shown that firms often employ a governance approach that includes formal and 
relational mechanisms to provide safeguarding and facilitate a successful collaboration 
(Dahlquist & Griffith, 2015). Firms entering alliances view ex ante contracts and ex post 
monitoring as the primary formal governance approaches to structuring partners’ behaviour 
(Zhang & Zhou 2013). Relational mechanisms, by contrast, govern implicitly what is deemed 
acceptable behavior of the partners. The governance literature has suggested social relations 
may be controlled by a range of shared norms, including flexibility, mutuality, solidarity, and 
information exchange (Abdi & Aulakh, 2014). 
The spectre of opportunism eroding the development of long-term alliance relationships 
(Barnes et al., 2010), encourages partners to use monitoring mechanisms to align alliance 
activities and partners’ behaviors toward the achievement of common goals (Kale & Singh, 
2009). While monitoring serves as a control mechanism that reliably supresses partner 
opportunism (Heide et al., 2007), the use of and reliance on contracts varies across alliance 
settings. For instance, the completeness of contracts and the importance of meeting 
contractually specified objectives varies across cultural and legal systems (Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 
2010; Zhou & Xu, 2012). Hence, the focus of our study is on monitoring as an efficacious 
means of taking control. 
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Monitoring, in the purest sense, represents a unilateral control mechanism; which is defined as 
“an effort made by one party to measure or meter the performance of another”, and ensures 
that “the value created through a firm’s marketing decisions can be claimed by the focal firm” 
(Heide et al., 2007, pp. 425-426). Industrial relationships are monitored formally in two main 
ways (Lange, 2008). First, process monitoring may be used by the focal firm to influence the 
behavior of the counterpart by ensuring that they follow specific alliance processes (i.e., 
sequenced activities) to achieve desired goals. We define process monitoring as the effort made 
by the focal firm to monitor partner processes that are expected to produce desired goals (Heide 
et al., 2007). The second form of monitoring, output monitoring, can assist the focal firm in 
influencing the behavior of its partner by predetermining specific performance levels that need 
to be achieved as a result of alliance task completion (Bello & Gilliland, 1997). Output 
monitoring is defined as the effort made by the focal firm to monitor the visible consequences 
of a partner’s actions (Heide et al., 2007). 
Further, a firm may verify its partner’s behavior via relational governance. We posit that 
information exchange norms constitute a bilateral approach to the monitoring task of assessing 
the counterpart’s behavior. Information exchange norms are defined as the expectation that the 
parties will freely and actively provide useful information to each other (Jap & Ganesan, 2000). 
The vast thrust of governance research has focused on examining individual effects of 
unilateral and bilateral controls on performance outcomes (Li et al., 2010). Against this 
backdrop, a growing number of alliance scholars have sought to debate whether formal and 
relational governance approaches substitute or complement each other in curtailing 
opportunism (Zhou & Xu, 2012) and enhancing performance outcomes (Gundlach & Cannon, 
2010). One view is that shared norms substitute for formal governance approaches, and vice-
versa (Adler, 2001; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Stump & Heide, 1996). The second, polar 
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view is that formal and relational governance approaches complement each other and can be 
deployed concurrently (Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Luo, 2007; Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). 
A third set of scholars have sought recently to reconcile the polar views by arguing that 
unilateral and bilateral controls can substitute and/or complement each other, depending on the 
mechanisms involved and contextual factors in their deployment (Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Zhou 
& Xu, 2012). The present study contributes to this unifying view by investigating the interplay 
of different forms of unilateral and bilateral monitoring in the context of strategic alliances. 
Unlike prior studies that focused on the interactions of relational governance, generally, with 
contractual governance approaches (Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Zhou & Xu, 2012) or unilateral 
monitoring mechanisms (Heide et al., 2007; Stouthuysen et al., 2012), we focus exclusively on 
the monitoring task. 
2.3. Theoretical background  
The current dark side perspective adopts the position that “interfirm relationships can be treated 
largely as analogous to the interpersonal mindset” (Dant & Gleiberman, 2011, p. 1428). In 
theorizing the effect of the personality trait, desire for control (Burger, 1985), on strategic 
decisions and performance outcomes in alliances, we draw on two affiliated theories. Upper 
echelons theory suggests that it is possible to predict an organization’s strategic decisions and 
performance based on the characteristics of top managers (Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). The logic is that firm-level strategic decisions are a reflection of the personality 
of top managers. That alliance management teams are a reflection of the personalities of the 
executives involved has long been supported in work theorizing spillovers of (inter)personal, 
psychological processes (e.g., propensity to trust, relational stress, autonomy needs, and 
attraction) to the (inter)firm level (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007; Dant & Gleiberman, 2011; 
Robson, Katsikeas, & Bello, 2008; Zhang, Henke, & Griffith, 2009). 
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Moreover, personality trait theory asserts that an individual’s personality drives his/her 
behaviors, which, in turn, cause certain outcomes (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Funder, 2001; 
Pervin, 1994). Accordingly, the personalities of senior managers representing each firm in the 
alliance can play a pivotal role in shaping key strategic decisions pertaining to how to govern 
and develop the alliance business. The conceptual framework depicted in Figure 1 summarizes 
our arguments that the focal firm’s desire for control drives (process and output) monitoring 
decisions, which in turn impact the focal firm’s performance in the alliance; and that unilateral 
(information exchange norms) and bilateral (process and output monitoring) control 
mechanisms function as substitutes and/or complements in the alliance. Not only is our focus 
on the dark side of the personality trait, desire for control, and its effects on monitoring 
decisions, but also we seek to uncover circumstances where there are negative effects of 
monitoring mechanisms on performance outcomes. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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3. Study hypotheses 
3.1. Desire for control  
Personality trait theory is a personality dispositional perspective that suggests an individual’s 
personality is characterized by traits that drive decisions and behaviors toward the achievement 
of desired goals. The majority of studies on personality traits focus on the role of bright traits 
(e.g., agreeableness and conscientiousness) (Spain, Harms, & LeBreton, 2014), suggesting that 
these influence, describe, and explain individuals’ decisions and behaviors (Costa & McCrae, 
1992; Fang et al., 2011). While bright traits have been applied previously to the marketing 
management area (Dant & Gleiberman, 2011), scholars have yet to scrutinize the influence of 
dark traits (e.g., desire for control and propensity to distrust) on organizational decisions and 
behaviors (Raja, Johns, & Ntalianis, 2004). 
In alliance management, a main strategic decision relates to how to monitor a strategic alliance 
in order to achieve desired goals. Despite an abundance of research on the topic, there remains 
a lack of clarity with respect to what drives monitoring decisions in alliances (Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005). Indeed, a review of the literature reveals that scholars have paid no attention 
to desire for control playing a key role in determining how firms monitor the alliance business. 
Prestudy interviews revealed the existence of firms wherein the pattern of characteristic 
thoughts is driven by the importance of being in control in their interfirm exchanges. The 
interviews suggested desire for control is linked to Machiavellian personality types that do not 
emphasize the need to forge cohesive and cooperative partnerships. 
Establishing a strategic alliance not only involves pooling proprietary knowledge resources 
with the partner, but also delegating responsibilities and relinquishing control over such 
resources to them (Dimitratos, Lioukas, Ibeh, & Wheeler, 2009). Some partner firms are 
reluctant to relinquish control over their most valuable knowledge in an alliance, given a 
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perceived need to protect this against the counterpart’s potential competitive and opportunistic 
behaviors. The more valuable the knowledge initially shared and potentially created in an 
alliance, the greater the desire to have control over the partner (Gebhardt & Brosschot, 2002; 
Inkpen & Currall, 2004; Zhang & Zhou, 2013). 
We assert that desire for control is a dark trait that resides in firms―within the alliance 
decision-making unit if not more broadly―and shapes their alliance management strategies. 
Because individual personality consists of biological traits that drive specific responses 
according to different situational stimuli (Ryckman, 1982), and owing to the fact that the 
personality of a firm is the reflection of the personality of its senior managers (i.e., upper 
echelons perspective), desire for control can prevent strategic alliances from developing 
embedded ties. Moreover, this dark personality trait drives alliance partners to manipulate and 
influence monitoring decisions in pursuit of their own performance outcomes, even if this 
undermines alliance development. The logic lies in that a dark personality trait may make a 
firm sensitive to short-term costs and benefits and drive exploitative strategies (Greenbaum et 
al., 2014; O’Boyle et al., 2012) that manifest in how alliance partners’ behaviors and 
performance will be monitored. Desire for control increases the likelihood of a partner’s 
dissatisfaction with the way the alliance’s work is proceeding and alliance outcomes are 
distributed. As such, unilateral (process and output) monitoring decisions are driven by the 
desire to exercise control over the alliance partner and core knowledge stored in the alliance, 
rather than by what is an appropriate balance of formal controls in light of the circumstances 
of the alliance (cf. Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004). Therefore: 
H1. There is a positive relationship between desire for control and process monitoring 
 
H2. There is a positive relationship between desire for control and output monitoring  
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3.2. Monitoring and performance in the alliance 
Scholars have not yet reached agreement on how to measure the performance of strategic 
alliances. Against this backdrop, our study focuses on the efficiency form of focal firm 
performance in the alliance, which is defined as the ratio of the firm’s alliance performance 
outcomes to its inputs required to achieve these (Robson et al., 2008). Efficiency performance 
takes into account the degree of task completion and goal attainment (i.e., effectiveness 
performance), but in relation to how cost effectively these are achieved. Strategic alliance 
management, which involves integrating the resources and capabilities of two or more firms 
that may or may not have opportunistic tendencies, can involve significant transaction costs. 
Notwithstanding that monitoring strategies have received enduring attention in industrial 
relationships research, there remains a lack of understanding about their effects on partnership 
performance (Heide et al., 2007). Theories justifying the use of monitoring as a control 
mechanism are based on the rationale that monitoring increases institutional pressures to 
behave according to rules and/or norms (Murry & Heide, 1998; Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
Against this backdrop, monitoring should have a positive impact on performance (Grewal et 
al., 2010). Nonetheless, following Håkansson and Ford (2002), we take the view that control 
mechanisms are important but also dangerous to the task of managing the performance of 
interfirm relationships. Several alliance theorists have cautioned that a partner’s monitoring 
decisions can dampen its performance outcomes (Jiang et al., 2008; Zhang & Zhou, 2013). 
More specifically, scholars assert that monitoring can crowd out value-creating behaviors and 
undermine the development of alliances (Ishida & Brown, 2011; Murry & Heide, 1998). A 
firm’s strict monitoring of the behavior of the alliance partner in line with agreed upon 
processes, may demotivate them (Heide et al., 2007); that is, to the extent that they perceive 
their self-determination and self-evaluation are undermined by intrusions into their task 
responsibilities (Frey, 1993). Process monitoring reduces the willingness of an alliance partner 
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to increase its work effort, and comply with behavioral standards, when this monitoring 
strategy is perceived as obstructive, intrusive, and distrustful (Ishida & Brown, 2011). Such 
negative perceptions can dampen goal-directed value creation and increase opportunism-
related costs in the partnership. 
Monitoring the partner’s achievement of desired goals is also expected to deter the efficient 
achievement of performance outcomes. Output control would generally be seen by the partner 
as more discreet, and less strict, than process control (Luo, Shenkar, & Nyaw, 2001). 
Nevertheless, it has a demotivating effect that creates ambiguity and dissatisfaction among 
alliance partners, because it is based on objective measures of performance (e.g., sales growth, 
market share, and profit) that are known to be difficult to obtain in the context of strategic 
alliances (Jiang et al., 2008; Thompson, 1967). The lack of overall direction given to an alliance 
partner would not be conducive to value co-creation. What is more, output control increases 
the scope for opportunism as an alliance partner is left alone to select the means by which to 
reach relevant outcomes (Anderson & Oliver, 1987). Vulnerability to opportunism is not as 
high as in the case of the dark side of close ties; still, output monitoring could increase 
opportunism costs somewhat. Partner firms that feel autonomous and independent as they 
advance toward predetermined alliance goals may, due to the presence of discreet monitoring 
(Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2002), contribute to a culture of unawareness of each other’s behaviors 
in the alliance. Taken together, the above logic suggests: 
H3. There is a negative relationship between process monitoring and performance in the 
alliance 
 
H4. There is a negative relationship between output monitoring and performance in the alliance 
 
While several partnership governance studies have focused on examining effects of individual 
monitoring mechanisms on performance outcomes (e.g., Gundlach & Cannon, 2010; Li et al., 
2010), relatively few studies (e.g., Heide et al., 2007; Stouthuysen et al., 2012) conceptualized 
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separate output and process mechanism effects. These studies focused on interaction effects of 
formal control mechanisms with relational governance, which mirrors the wider governance 
literature’s emphasis on contingency relationships involving relationship-based structures 
(Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Zhou & Xu, 2012). For instance, Heide et al. (2007) asserted that 
opportunism effects of output and process monitoring are moderated by micro-level social 
contracts. These authors found that micro-level social contracts strengthen the effect of output 
monitoring on mitigating opportunism, but weaken the effect of process monitoring on 
guarding against self-seeking behaviors. In similar manner, we posit that information exchange 
norms substitute for the firm’s use of process monitoring to oversee the counterpart and drive 
performance, but complement their use of outcome monitoring to this end. 
In alliance businesses, information exchange norms: (a) create expectations that alliance 
partners will share valuable knowledge (Heide & John, 1992; Ju, Zhao, & Wang, 2014); (b) 
make alliance partners aware of each other’s needs and requirements (Zhou & Xu, 2012); and 
(c) align alliance partners’ efforts toward the achievement of common goals (Jap & Ganesan, 
2000; Lado, Dant, & Tekleab, 2008). While it could be expected that information exchange 
norms enhance performance outcomes in alliances, they can increase partners’ vulnerability to 
core knowledge leakage—especially when the level of information exchange between alliance 
partners is high. The logic lies in that this bilateral monitoring strategy encourages the social 
sharing of complementary, proprietary knowledge as a means of overseeing alliance work 
(Bello & Gilliland, 1997). 
We posit that the interplay between process monitoring and information exchange norms is 
inefficient and negatively shapes performance outcomes. The logic is twofold. First, 
information exchange norms accelerate the crowding out effects of process monitoring. At a 
fundamental level, information exchange norms are incompatible with strict process 
monitoring and, thus, high levels of both causes confusion in alliances (Zhou & Xu, 2012). The 
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former implies that the partners work together in determining the process of creating value in 
the alliance and moving toward shared objectives, whereas the latter imposes an asymmetric 
structure that undermines partners’ sense of self-determination. Second, process monitoring 
creates a partner reactance effect that is likely to utilize the increased risk of core knowledge 
leakage under conditions of high information exchange norms. 
We expect that information exchange between the alliance partners will strengthen the 
performance relevance of output monitoring through a productive mode of higher safeguarding 
(Dahlquist & Griffith, 2015). In the absence of open information exchange, output monitoring 
lacks the ability to optimize a partner’s task completion toward achievable goals. Information 
exchange brings a level of transparency to the partners’ work, which reduces worries about 
opportunism and surfaces issues pertaining to inefficiencies in the direction of the work. In 
sum, bilateral monitoring augments output monitoring’s focus on goal attainment by providing 
cohesion to the complex work of the alliance and guarding against opportunism and 
inefficiency (Heide et al., 2007). Hence: 
H5. Information exchange norms will negatively moderate the impact of process monitoring 
on performance in the alliance 
 
H6. Information exchange norms will positively moderate the impact of output monitoring on 
performance in the alliance 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Research setting 
Strategic alliances existing in practice differ in terms of legal and institutional arrangements 
(e.g., involving equity, spanning borders, or otherwise) (Kale & Singh, 2009; Yoshino & 
Rangan, 1995). The present study includes equity, nonequity, domestic, and international 
alliances; but only focuses on those between two partner firms. The rationale is that strategic 
alliances including more than two partners potentially involve more complicated decisions. 
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The unit of analysis is the individual strategic alliance at the post-formation stage of 
development; eligible alliances had to have at least one year of life to allow performance to 
stabilize. In line with prior alliance research (Bello et al., 2010), our study adopts the 
perspective of a focal partner firm that revealed information on its own personality, monitoring 
decisions, and performance in the alliance. We asked informants to provide answers based on 
their firm’s perspective—rather than their own personal perspective—about a specific strategic 
alliance with which they were very familiar. As such, the level of analysis adopted was the firm 
level rather than that of individual managers. 
4.2. Informant identification and survey response  
The research hypotheses were tested using a cross-sectional survey of ongoing strategic 
alliances. We built a sampling frame of 1,341 eligible informants randomly selected from a 
business social network (i.e., LinkedIn) that contained up-to-date information of informants’ 
characteristics and contact details, and based on our screening of their ability and willingness 
to report information on the phenomenon under examination. Key informants were those 
directly involved in the management of an ongoing alliance, who were also responsible for, 
and knowledgeable about, monitoring decisions taken on behalf of the firm they were 
representing in the alliance. Strategic alliances tend to be managed by a separate organizational 
unit and individuals at the highest level of management (e.g., they may report directly to the 
CEO) (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Lavie, Haunschild, & Khanna, 2012). 
Thus, one senior executive can respond on behalf of the focal partner firm. 
Following recent research practice (Zeriti, Robson, Spyropoulou, & Leonidou, 2014), we 
contacted potential informants by email and/or telephone to verify if they were responsible for 
the management of an ongoing strategic alliance; create interest and request their participation 
in the project; and check their knowledgeability of the different aspects covered in the study. 
A link to the online survey and cover letter explaining the study’s purpose, followed by two 
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reminders and a “Thank You” message, were then sent to the informants. We received back 
447 questionnaires, of which we eliminated 29 incomplete questionnaires, 11 that had low 
informant competency (i.e., based on a respondent competency test—see subsection 4.5), and 
3 that related to alliances with less than one year of operations. The response rate of 30.1 
percent (404 out of 1341 potential informants) is comparable to other alliance studies targeting 
top executive informants (Hitt et al., 2000). 
4.3. Sample characteristics  
A multi-industry sample of alliances among U.S., E.U. and Asian firms was used to ensure a 
large enough sample to enable rigorous analysis of the data and generalizability of the findings 
(Bello et al., 2010). The alliances spanned high-technology development (35.5%), services 
(27.8%), pharmaceutical (7.2%), information technology (21.7%), telecommunications (3.2%), 
manufacturing (2.9%), and retailing (1.7%) industries. Our sample comprised 52.0% domestic 
strategic alliances and 48.0% international strategic alliances. The sample included informants 
who were currently managing an ongoing alliance for an average period of 2.5 years. A total 
of 69.8% of informants were CEOs, (Vice) Presidents, Managing Directors, and Alliance 
Directors, while 30.2% were Alliance Managers and Alliance Executives. 
4.4. Questionnaire development and pre-test 
Each of the study constructs was conceptualized as a first-order construct and measured using 
multi-item, Likert-type (i.e., 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) scales taken from the 
literature, and modified to the alliance context via prestudy interviews. Indeed, interviews with 
seven senior academics familiar with alliance research were conducted to assess if the 
measurement scales were representative of each construct. The proposed conceptual model was 
also scrutinized by the academic experts. Moreover, in-depth interviews, lasting between 40 
and 60 minutes, were conducted with four CEOs, three Managing Directors, and three Alliance 
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Directors to assess the validity of the proposed model, refine the questionnaire, and gain 
insights with respect to how to conduct the survey (e.g., Griffith & Dimitrova, 2014; Li, Qian, 
& Qian, 2014). Our pre-study fieldwork established that interviewees did not have many issues 
relating to the interpretation of items used to capture the study constructs. Still, we dropped 
some scale items and rephrased others on the basis of their feedback. 
Finally, we pre-tested the revised questionnaire by sending it to 77 eligible informants. We 
received 22 completed questionnaires (excluded from the main study). The pilot study did not 
show any concerns with questionnaire length, item ambiguity, or clarity of instructions. 
4.5. Measures 
A recent review (Christoffersen, Plenborg, & Robson, 2014) revealed that alliance performance 
is most often captured using subjective performance measures, while objective stability and 
accounting measures are less commonly used. Alliance scholars have mainly used subjective 
measures of performance outcomes rather than objective ones as: (a) it has been empirically 
demonstrated that subjective performance measures correlate well with objective performance 
measures, and this justifies their validity and reliability in measuring strategic alliance 
performance outcomes; and (b) it is extremely difficult to obtain reliable objective data of 
alliance performance outcomes separately from corporate-level performance data (Kauser & 
Shaw, 2004). We therefore employed a subjective measure of alliance performance. Given that 
monitoring routines police opportunism-related costs, we conceptualized focal firm 
performance in the alliance as efficiency. We tapped efficiency using four items adapted from 
Robson et al. (2008) and Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and Aulakh (2001). A fifth item, “My 
firm efficiently carries out alliance tasks”, was deleted in measure validation due to its low 
loading. 
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Desire for control was measured based on five items adapted mainly from Dahling et al. (2009), 
but also from Burger (1992). Process monitoring was tapped on the basis of five items modified 
from the work of Atuahene-Gima and Li (2002) and Fang, Palmatier, Scheer, and Li (2008). 
Output monitoring was measured on a three-item scale adapted from Atuahene-Gima and Li 
(2002) and Challagalla and Shervani (1996). Information exchange norms were measured 
using three items taken from Jap and Ganesan (2000). 
We included five control variables in the study to account for additional determinants of 
performance in the alliance. Nonequity alliances were represented in the performance model 
as a dummy variable (0 = equity, 1 = nonequity). Likewise, we deployed a dummy to control 
for the different dynamics of finite, project-based alliances versus those with no-end-point (0 
= fixed-end-point, 1 = no-end-point). Large alliances may enjoy advantages over small- and 
medium-sized alliances in securing partner firms’ contributions of resources necessary to 
achieve efficiencies (Bello et al., 2010). We thus included a size dummy to distinguish alliances 
with over 500 employees from smaller ones (0 = small and medium size, 1 = large size). The 
high-technology sector involves intensive alliance activities associated with efficiencies (Stuart, 
2000). We control for these differences via a high-technology dummy (0 = other industries, 1 
= high-technology industry). Finally, we control for alliance duration, as alliances may become 
more successful with increasing years of operation (Bello et al., 2010). 
4.6. Informant quality  
It was deemed that a senior executive or alliance manager, responsible for the management of 
the alliance entity, would be able to reveal valid information on behalf of their firm in the 
alliance (Lavie et al., 2012). However, following Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello (2009), the 
final part of the questionnaire contained four questions used to assess respondents’ (1) 
knowledge of all the areas covered in the survey, (2) familiarity with the strategic decisions 
taken in this alliance, (3) responsibility for taking decisions in this alliance, and (4) confidence 
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in answering the alliance questions in this survey. Individual responses to the competency 
questions were checked and those that exhibited a score lower than four, on a seven-point rating 
scale, for any question were dropped from the analysis. Ultimately, the mean score across these 
items was 6.19. 
5. Analysis and results 
5.1. Measure validation 
Construct validity and reliability were assessed by following instructions suggested by 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). Initially, we ran a series of exploratory factor analyses. Results 
demonstrated that factor solutions were consistent with theory. Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
scores for the main study constructs were satisfactory, as these ranged from .82 to .88. Average 
variance extracted (AVE) for each construct was equal or higher to the cut-off of .50 (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981). Alpha scores and AVEs are reported in Table 1, along with correlations 
among the study constructs and control variables. 
Table 1: Correlations, Descriptive Statistics, and Reliability Measures 
Variables Mean S.D. α AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Desire for control  4.42 1.18 .83 .50 1          
2 Process Monitoring 4.82 1.20 .87 .58 .16** 1         
3 Output Monitoring 5.06 1.39 .88 .58 .12* .65** 1        
4 Information Exchange Norms 6.17 .73 .85 .66 -.08 .29** .23** 1       
5 Performance in the Alliance  4.92 1.01 .82 .55 -.19** .22** .16** .31** 1      
6 Learning Intent (Marker)  4.07 1.26 .76 .55 .04 .12* .09 .05 .12* 1     
7 Nonequity Dummy  .81 .40   .01 .04 .07 .10* .10* -.11* 1    
8 No-End-Point Dummy  .75 .43   .06 .05 .02 -.04 -.03 .20 .17** 1   
9 Size Dummy  .41 .49   -.01 .07 .06 -.02 .06 .04 .01 .19** 1  
10 High-Technology Dummy .36 .48   -.06 .06 .04 .01 -.01 -.04 .12* -.05 -.02 1 
11 Duration 4.81 3.95   -.01 .05 .03 -.01 -.04 -.03 -.06 .07 .15** .01 
** Correlation significant at the .01 level (two-tailed); *Correlation significant at the .05 level (two-tailed) 
Marker = Marker variable used for method bias procedures 
We next ran a confirmatory factor analysis in EQS―using the elliptical reweighted least-
squares (ERLS) estimation procedure―for the main study constructs. ERLS allows unbiased 
estimates for both multivariate normal and non-normal data (Sharma, Durvasula, & Dillon, 
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1989). The results are reported in Table 2. The goodness-of-fit indices show a satisfactory fit 
to the data: Chi-Square statistic = 399.70 (df = 160), p = .00; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .96; 
Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .96; Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .95; Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .06; and Root Mean Squared Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) = .05. All the factor loadings exceed .61 and are significant at p < .01. Thus, it is 
reasonable to claim that the measurement scales possess satisfactory convergent validity.  
Table 2: Measurement Model Results 
Factor and Items Standardized 
Loading 
t-Value 
Desire for Control   
My firm would like to give the orders in its dealings with the partner firm .67 12.42 
My firm would appreciate having control over the partner firm   .73 13.70 
My firm would enjoy being able to influence the behavior of the partner firm   .64 11.72 
My firm would prefer to decide what the partner firm should be doing rather than vice versa .86 16.97 
My firm would appreciate making strategic decisions on behalf of the alliance .62 11.23 
Process Monitoring   
My firm regularly monitors the quality control maintained by the partner firm .80 16.14 
My firm monitors the extent to which the partner firm follows established procedures .87 18.19 
My firm evaluates the procedures the partner firm uses to accomplish alliance tasks .78 15.49 
My firm closely monitors the partner firm after asking it to do something  .64 11.97 
My firm requires the partner firm to report regularly its handling of alliance operations .72 13.92 
Output Monitoring   
My firm establishes specific performance goals for the partner firm .85 17.69 
My firm monitors the extent to which the partner firm achieves its performance goals .94 20.48 
My firm believes that if the partner firm did not meet its performance goals, it’d be required to 
explain  
.80 16.35 
Information Exchange Norms   
Both partners are expected to provide any information that may help achieve alliance goals .71 13.55 
Partners are expected to keep one another informed about events/changes that may affect the 
alliance 
.85 16.87 
Both partners are expected to frequently exchange information with each other .87 17.41 
Performance in the Alliance   
In this alliance, my firm’s resources are deployed efficiently .79 15.96 
In this alliance, procedures and mechanisms for alliance resource utilisation are cost-effective .88 18.39 
In this alliance, my firm effectively converts resource inputs into alliance outputs .87 18.09 
My firm perceives that alliance tasks are efficiently carried out by the partner firm .68 12.98 
Fit Index: Chi-Sq. =  399.70 (df = 160), p = .00; CFI = .96; IFI = .96; NNFI = .95; SRMR = .06; RMSEA= .05 
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We assessed the discriminant validity of the measures by determining whether the AVE for 
each construct was greater than its highest shared variance with other constructs (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). The results of this test revealed no problems (see Table 1). Taken together, 
these tests show that the multi-item scales used to capture the variances of the study constructs 
are both valid and reliable. 
5.2. Measurement bias 
We sought to reduce common method bias (CMB) in the data through procedures 
recommended by MacKenzie & Podsakoff (2012): namely, ensuring informants had adequate 
experience with the topic, assuring informant anonymity, reverse coding some items, and 
avoiding double-barrelled, complex, and abstract questions. Nevertheless, we deployed the 
correlation-based marker variable technique to detect the presence of CMB (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). Specifically, we used a marker-variable (i.e., learning intent; 
four-item scale adopted from Simonin, 2004) that is assumed to have no relationship with at 
least one of the study variables (i.e., desire for control). CMB can be detected by observing the 
correlation value(s) between the marker variable and the theoretically unrelated variable(s) in 
the model. The correlation matrix (Table 1) indicates low shared variance of the marker 
variable with the theoretically unrelated variable (r = .04). We used this correlation as the basis 
for calculating a CMB-corrected matrix (see Malhotra, Kim, & Patil, 2006). Next, we estimated 
a marker measurement model using the corrected matrix; a Chi-Square difference test between 
this model and our original measurement model did not show any deterioration in fit (ΔChi-Sq. 
= .27). This test suggests CMB is unlikely to explain the study results.  
In order to reduce nonresponse problems, we gave informants the opportunity to complete the 
online survey in multiple web sessions. What is more, we compared late and early responses 
with respect to the study constructs using a t-test procedure. No significant differences (p < .05) 
were detected and, thus, nonresponse bias does not appear to be an issue in our study. 
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5.3. Hypothesis testing 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to test the hypothesized relationships, again 
using ERLS estimation. The interaction effect was incorporated using Ping’s (1995) approach 
and formulae for estimating moderation effects. The structural model results are reported in 
Figure 2. The model fits the data satisfactorily (Chi-Sq. = 803.17 (df = 336) p = .00; CFI = .91; 
IFI = .91; NNFI = .91; SRMR = .11; RMSEA = .06). 
Figure 2: Structural Model Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The structural model results show that the focal firm’s desire for control positively affects both 
process monitoring (b = .22, t = 2.74, p < .01) and output monitoring (b = .22, t = 2.59, p < .01). 
These results support H1 and H2, respectively, in line with the assertion that firms apply their 
desire to exercise control to actual monitoring procedures in alliances. As per our dark side 
thesis, we predicted negative links between process monitoring and performance in the alliance 
25 
 
(H3), and between output monitoring and performance (H4). Surprisingly, the results did not 
provide support for these relationships. They reveal instead that process monitoring is 
positively linked to performance (b = .13, t = 2.97, p < .01) and output monitoring is unrelated 
to performance (b= -.02, t = -.47, p > .05). 
The results also show that performance effects of process and output monitoring change under 
different conditions of the moderator, information exchange norms. Specifically, the 
interaction term of process monitoring and information exchange norms is negatively linked to 
performance (b = -.08, t = -3.24, p < .01), while the interaction term between output monitoring 
and information exchange norms is positively associated with performance (b = .09, t = 3.90, 
p < .01). These results are as per our H5 and H6 predictions. We plot these moderation effects 
in Figure 3. The plots confirm that the firm’s use of process monitoring to oversee the 
counterpart drives its performance outcomes only if there is a low level of information 
exchange between the alliance partners; as such, information exchange norms substitute for 
process monitoring. By contrast, the focal firm’s use of output monitoring is negatively linked 
to its performance outcomes in the presence of a low level of information exchange. The two 
mechanisms complement one another in that high information exchange norms reduce the 
negative performance influence of output monitoring.  
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Figure 3: Interaction Effects  
A. Information Exchange Norms and Process Monitoring 
 
B. Information Exchange Norms and Output Monitoring 
 
 
The results also suggest a direct effect of information exchange norms on focal firm 
performance in the alliance (b = .24, t = 4.20, p < .01). As such, alliance partners may efficiently 
deploy information exchange norms to oversee implementation of alliance tasks. None of the 
five control variables included in the model have significant links to performance. We ran an 
additional model in which a direct path was added from desire to control to performance in the 
alliance. That the path coefficient was not significant (b = - .15, t = -1.68, p < .05) is to be 
expected given our theory-based assertion that personality traits lead to behaviors with 
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performance relevance. The study findings prove robust to the systematic inclusion or 
exclusion of these control variables and links. 
The literature implies that the monitoring of an overseas partner may pose additional challenges 
in alliances (Robson et al., 2008). As the sample includes sizeable groups of domestic (n = 210) 
and international (n = 194) alliances, we were able to rerun the structural model for two 
subsamples. The results are consistent across domestic and international alliances and reinforce 
our hypothesis testing in the full sample, with two exceptions. The desire for control to process 
monitoring path is positive for domestic alliances (b = .28, t = 2.16, p < .01), but not for 
international alliances (b = .17, t = 1.59, p > .05). By contrast, desire for control is positively 
related to output monitoring among international alliances (b = .27, t = 2.39, p < .01) and not 
domestic alliances (b = .17, t = 1.33, p > .05). Firms appear to satisfy their need for control 
using whichever form of monitoring best suits the circumstances. Desire for control would 
seem not to motivate process monitoring in international alliances since firms recognize that 
they lack understanding of the complexities of the foreign partner’s work sufficient to oversee 
these processes (Bello & Gilliland, 1997). Process control is an efficacious mechanism for 
exerting control over the partner’s alliance work in less institutionally complex, domestic 
alliance settings (Dahlquist & Griffith, 2015). 
6. Conclusions and implications 
Because strategic alliances juxtapose cooperation and competition, they make firms uncertain 
about whether or not the counterpart will behave opportunistically. In response, marketing and 
management scholars have asserted that within a trusting type of alliance the risk of 
opportunism normally reduces, and inefficiencies linked to mechanisms for monitoring and 
enforcing contracts may be avoided (Jiang et al., 2015). Scholarly emphasis on relational 
exchange behaviors has led to insightful scrutiny of negative outcomes of raised vulnerability 
from soft ties, following the dark side of close relationships perspective (Anderson & Jap, 2005; 
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Noordhoff et al., 2011). Yet, in reality many alliance relationships unravel without ever 
becoming close. We theorize that these alliances are not immune to dark side mechanisms and 
could face the downside of the dark personality trait, desire for control. The literature suggests 
control mechanisms are necessary to reduce vulnerability and guard against opportunism and 
poor performance (Chang, Bai, & Li, 2015; Lange, 2008; Luo, Zhang, & Huang, 2011). We 
departed from this assumption, arguing instead that desire for control drives firms to 
manipulate monitoring mechanisms in alliances, and that these self-serving decisions can have 
a negative impact on alliance performance. 
6.1. Theoretical implications 
The study extends existing knowledge in three main ways. First, drawing from upper echelons 
theory (Hambrick, 2007), we introduce the dark personality trait, desire for control, to a 
literature stream that has featured the onset of the dark side of close relationships (Scheer et al., 
2012), but has yet to theorize the dark side of personality traits that discourages a firm from 
developing relational embeddedness in its alliances. 
Second, previous research is unclear regarding antecedents of monitoring decisions in alliances 
(Wuyts & Geyskens, 2005). Drawing upon personality trait theory (e.g., Funder, 2001), we 
demonstrate for the first time that a firm’s desire for control links to decisions on the use of 
process and output monitoring mechanisms. Desire for control appears to drive the firm to 
enact self-serving monitoring mechanisms that are not oriented toward shared goals in the 
alliance (Greenbaum et al., 2014). Still, our robustness check involving international and 
domestic subsamples revealed an efficacy argument—that output rather than process 
monitoring is better suited to international alliances, and vice versa for domestic alliances. The 
observation that desire for control drives output and/or process monitoring in alliances 
challenges the embeddedness position that partners will choose to interact to develop soft ties 
that then reduce their motivation to monitor one another. 
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Third, we add to recent debate on substitutes and complements effects between formal and 
relational governance approaches (Abdi & Aulakh, 2014; Gundlach & Cannon, 2010; 
Stouthuysen et al., 2012), by focusing on the interplay among unilateral and bilateral 
monitoring mechanisms in alliances. Specifically, we demonstrate that information exchange 
norms substitute for process monitoring, but complement output monitoring. 
The results show that output monitoring has a nonsignificant impact on focal firm performance 
in the alliance. However, under conditions of low information exchange norms, output 
monitoring reduces a firm’s performance in the alliance, providing some evidence of self-
serving monitoring and reduced performance, as per the downside of dark personality traits. In 
the presence of output monitoring and absence of information exchange, the partner would be 
left alone to select the means by which to reach set outcomes, which is likely to demotivate 
them; in effect, increasing the risk of opportunism and reducing task efficiency. 
We found that process monitoring enhances performance in the alliance, in contrast with our 
logic that dark personality traits drive self-serving control decisions that reduce performance 
(O’Boyle et al., 2012) and, also, previous findings showing no effect of behavior control on 
performance in partnerships (Stouthuysen et al., 2012). Even a dark personality trait may 
produce forms of monitoring that are constructive in that they benefit alliance performance. 
Nevertheless, performance outcomes of process monitoring decline under the condition of high 
information exchange norms. Under conditions of high process monitoring and high 
information exchange, the alliance partners would be confused about whether they should 
follow unilaterally prescribed work procedures or work together in a bilateral mode to 
determine the process of creating value. Further, strict process monitoring creates a partner 
reactance effect that could raise their intention to internalize and deploy core knowledge shared 
in the alliance (Gundlach & Cannon, 2010). Process monitoring may be utilized in a strategic 
sense, not only to monitor the counterpart, but also to exploit their confidence in the 
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collaboration and open disclosure of information intended to help achieve alliance goals. It 
would seem these mechanisms dampen, but do not overwhelm, process monitoring’s capacity 
to regulate and coordinate the alliance partner (Heide et al., 2007). 
6.2. Managerial implications  
This study provides multiple insights for managers. While firms should ideally make a decision 
on how to monitor an alliance that best achieves common goals and work efficiencies, the 
results imply that monitoring mechanisms can be a manifestation of the dark side of alliances. 
Specifically, desire for control may drive firms to enact self-serving monitoring decisions that 
might, under certain circumstances, reduce their performance outcomes. It is important that 
alliance decision-makers are cognisant of motivations their firms have stemming from dark 
personality traits, such as desire for control. A preoccupation with unilateral monitoring 
mechanisms can detract from a focus on information exchange norms as a solution to control—
our results suggest this form of bilateral monitoring is the strongest predictor of alliance 
performance. However, the results also support that firms should not deploy unilateral and 
bilateral controls in isolation, but rather adopt a holistic approach due to the complex interplay 
of process and output monitoring with information exchange norms in alliances. 
The study shows that firms set on utilizing strict process monitoring should limit the amount 
of valuable information exchanged in order to contain core knowledge leakage and not create 
ambiguity as to how task procedures are developed and followed. However, given the results 
reveal this substitutes effect, and also that information exchange norms themselves are effective 
in boosting alliance performance, it is advisable for practitioners to contemplate whether 
process controls are necessary in alliances that are cultivating normative behaviors to undergird 
the exchange. A related consideration is that process monitoring would appear to be more 
challenging to implement and lack efficacy in complex, international alliances. 
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By contrast, firms can derive advantage from increasing the amount of valuable information 
shared with the partner when output monitoring is in place; given the complements effect 
observed in the study. Under conditions of low information exchange norms, output monitoring 
actually reduces a firm’s performance in the alliance, providing evidence of self-serving 
monitoring. Information sharing addresses the partner demotivation downside of output 
monitoring, by ensuring that key tasks are being completed and outcomes achieved. 
7. Limitations and future research directions 
The study results should be viewed in light of certain limitations. Attempts to generalize from 
our evidence should be made with caution as the findings focus on strategic alliances among 
U.S., E.U., and Asian firms. Replicating the study in other empirical contexts would help assess 
the external validity of the current findings. Moreover, the study lacks dyadic data that could 
capture interplay and tensions between the two partners’ personality traits. Despite offering the 
benefit of a holistic picture of dark side effects, collecting paired data in a sample such as ours 
(i.e., including cross-border alliances) would be acutely difficult. We also employed a cross-
sectional design that provides a snapshot of construct relationships, limiting the ability of the 
study to claim causal inferences. Although costly and time-consuming, the use of longitudinal 
designs in future research would add to our understanding of dynamics of the trait–control–
performance mechanism in strategic alliances (Ju et al., 2014). 
Beyond understanding the individual effects of desire for control, future research should 
examine whether additional dark personality traits in firms (e.g., propensity to distrust) 
influence strategic alliance decisions and performance outcomes. On the other hand, scholars 
might derive advantage from studying bright personality traits (e.g., propensity for trust, as per 
Bierly & Gallagher, 2007) and whether these lead to over-embedded relationships and the onset 
of the dark side of close relationships. Moreover, since we found a strong, positive impact of 
information exchange norms on performance, it is important that alliance scholars consider 
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whether bright personality traits indirectly affect performance via bilateral controls. While such 
links fall outside the scope of this study on the dark side of personality traits, they would be 
compatible with our general theorization of the role of personality traits in alliances. 
Finally, it would be fruitful for future studies to investigate whether desire for control functions 
as an orientation of the firm (cf. Chen et al., 2014). If so, it might influence a wider range of 
strategic decisions (e.g., (re)negotiation strategies), relationship quality (e.g., Barnes, Leonidou, 
Siu, & Leonidou, 2015), and governance approaches (e.g., Leonidou, Samiee, Aykol, & Talias, 
2014) in alliance settings. 
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Appendix: Indicative Empirical Studies on the Dark Side of Alliances and Partnerships  
Reference  Study Purpose  Theoretical Rationale  Empirical Approach Study Findings 
Moorman el al., 
1992 
To examine how trust between knowledge users and providers 
affects the perceived quality of interactions, level of 
involvement, and users’ commitments to relationships. 
Relational perspective. Cross-sectional survey of 779 marketing 
managers and marketing researchers in 
the U.S. 
Long-term relationships develop relational forces that weaken the positive 
effects of trust and commitment on service use. 
Ping, 1993 To examine the response intentions of retailers of hardware to 
relationship problems with suppliers, and their antecedents. 
Economics perspective. Cross-sectional survey involving 222 
hardware retailers in 50 U.S. states. 
Un-remedied problems cause retailers dissatisfaction, which may be 
considered as a signal of the dark side of channel relationships. 
Grayson & 
Ambler, 1999 
To examine if the dark side of business relationships 
negatively affects the relationship between relational factors 
and service use. 
Relational perspective. Cross-sectional survey involving 200 
marketing and advertising managers in 
the U.K. 
Long-term relationships negatively impact service use, and this weakens the 
positive effect of trust. 
Hibbard et al., 
2001 
To explain if the benefits of strong business relationships 
diminish over time. 
Relational perspective. Cross-sectional survey of 628 auto 
manufacturers and dealers in the U.S. 
The benefits of investing in building a closer relationships start to weaken 
over time. 
Jap & Anderson, 
2003 
To examine the ability of relationship safeguard mechanisms 
to mitigate opportunism behaviors, and offer a solution on how 
to manage and mitigate the dark side of business relationships. 
Transaction cost economics; 
agency theory; relational 
perspective. 
Cross-sectional survey involving 300 
buyers–supplier relationships in the U.S. 
Ex-post opportunism is evidence of the dark side of ongoing business 
relationships; goal congruence may mitigate negative consequences of the 
dark side, e.g., destabilization/termination of the relationship. 
Pressey & 
Tzokas, 2004 
To examine if export relationships can be sustainable over 
time. 
Trust–commitment 
perspective. 
Cross-sectional survey involving 212 
U.K. export firms. 
Long-term relationships are affected by the dark side due to declining degrees 
of affective and calculative commitment between partners. 
Anderson & Jap, 
2005 
To examine how the dark of close business relationships 
emerge. 
Relational perspective. Cross-sectional survey involving 1,540 
business relationships in the U.S.  
Mechanisms designed to build closer relationships and expand the size of the 
pie to be shared can concurrently poison their development. 
Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005 
To examine how a firm’s organizational culture influences 
governance decisions and the effectiveness of these decisions 
on curtailing the partner’s opportunism. 
Organizational culture 
perspective; transaction cost 
economics. 
Cross-sectional survey of 177 
purchasing managers of manufacturer 
firms in the Netherlands. 
Close relationships are less effective in curtailing a partner’s opportunism, 
because they may trigger rather than reduce the partner’s opportunism. 
Luo et al., 2007 To examine the impact of alliances between rivals on financial 
performance.  
Rivalry perspective. Cross-sectional survey with 228 
executives and archival data from the 
U.S. computer industry.  
Competition and cooperation are characterised by a dark side, which 
negatively affects firms’ profitability.  
Gu et al., 2008 To examine how and when Guanxi works as a governance 
mechanism that influences performance outcomes. 
Social capital theory. Cross-sectional survey involving 282 
firms in China. 
Ongoing relationships may develop destabilizing forces that cause the 
termination of the relationship. 
Poppo et al., 2008 To explain how trust develops in interorganizational 
relationships between manufacturers and their major suppliers. 
Interdependence 
perspective. 
Cross-sectional survey of 137 
purchasing managers in the U.S.  
Priory history between partner firms does not have a positive impact on trust, 
unless there is expectation of continuity. 
Fang et al., 2011 To identify how the dark side of relationships emerges and 
moderates links between relationship quality and outcomes. 
Tension-based view. 
 
Cross-sectional survey involving 500 
manufacturer firms in Taiwan.  
The dark side of business relationships emerges from imbalanced tensions 
between partner firms. 
Noordhoff et al., 
2011 
To examine if embedded ties hurt or help supplier innovation, 
depending on other conditions in the relationship. 
Relational perspective; 
knowledge theory.  
Cross-sectional survey involving 157 
B2B innovation relationships in the 
Netherlands. 
The dark side of embedded ties weakens suppliers’ benefits from customer 
innovation knowledge, though this varies depending on the dark side 
mechanism and governance context. 
Villena et al., 
2011 
To examine the impact of cognitive, structural, and relational 
social capital on value created via collaborative relationships.  
Social capital theory. Cross-sectional survey involving 132 
Spanish export firms. 
Social capital can improve strategic and operational performance outcomes, 
but it can also weaken performance outcomes. 
Day et al., 2013 To examine the benefits and risk of trust in buyer–supplier 
long-term relationships.  
Relational perspective.  In-depth interviews of managers in two 
anonymous firms and their suppliers.  
High trust in buyer–supplier, long-term relationships may cause inertia, 
resource misallocation, and negative dependency. 
Ekici, 2013 To examine the impact of changes in the level of trust on 
ongoing buyer–supplier relationships.  
Relational perspective. In-depth interviews with middle-scale 
U.S. businesses from different 
industries.  
A change of the level of trust may cause the emergence of relational dark side 
behaviors that can damage ongoing relationships.  
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